14. Microinsurance: by Mosley, Paul
1. Introduction
Risk, as emphasised by the recent World
Development Report (World Bank 2000) on poverty,
is a fundamental cause of underdevelopment.
Insurance makes it easier for people to tolerate
risks, by replacing the uncertain prospect of large
losses with the certainty of a small, regular
payment. It thus reduces vulnerability, and thereby
may stop markets from falling apart. Insurance is
one of the basic institutions which can provide a
defence against social and financial exclusion for
people whose existing coping strategies are failing,
and by protecting people’s livelihoods in this way, it
should encourage investment among lower income
groups. Nonetheless, as the recent World
Development Report on poverty puts it: ‘there are
almost no insurance markets in developing
countries because of problems of contract
enforcement and asymmetric information’ (World
Bank 2000: 143). Slightly hyperbolic though this
description of the situation is, there is no doubt
that the provision of one of the potentially most
poverty-reducing of all services is seriously
deficient, especially at the bottom end of the
market where risk-coping capacity is at its worst.
Thus the spotlight is thrown on what the
microfinance movement – so dynamic in other
parts of the financial spectrum – is able to do to
redeem this deficiency. This article examines what
this contribution might be and how its
effectiveness might be optimised.
Insurance everywhere is traded in a highly
imperfect market. The research which has been
done on microfinance customers’ expressed need
for risk management and insurance services
(Alderman and Paxson 1992; World Bank 2000:
Chapter 8; Sebstad and Cohen 2001) suggests a
substantial thwarted demand for insurance
services, and considerable use of informal
emergency loans, rotating savings and credit
associations, and other insurance-substitutes,
which probably increases in intensity as one moves
down the income scale. One factor affecting
variances in demand seems to be gender: as Elson
argues (1999: 616): ‘in general, risk-reducing
mechanisms have been much more a feature of
male forms of market participation – such
mechanisms include trade unions, job security
rights, social insurance benefit, business and
professional associations’.
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Finally, it should be noted that much of the benefit
from insurance – and therefore the demand for it –
has an impact on people other than those who
purchase the insurance. This is not only due to the
reduction of the poverty and inequality which
micro-insurance seeks to reduce. It is also because
insurance can stabilise income and thus save
financial institutions the costs of chasing unpaid
loans; it protects human capital by enabling
households hit by a shock to continue to make
school fee payments and seek medical treatment
for their families (see McCord 2000: 24); and it
protects social capital by preventing groups,
including families, from breaking up due to stress
over unpaid debts.
There are previous examples of insurance schemes
being delivered by external agencies in the past,
often in the form of crop yield guarantee schemes
for smallholders. The results have often been
disastrous, which explains much of the scepticism
currently expressed towards micro-insurance. The
message from these studies is of course not that the
demand for insurance is not there, but rather that
the supply side needs reconfiguring. The lessons
usually drawn (see World Bank 1989; Hazell et al
1986; Hazell 1992) have been that the supply
should be of insurance against one insurable
hazard only, such as death of the insured or
burglary; that it should be protected against the
moral hazard and adverse selection problems
which render insurance so vulnerable to financial
collapse, and which are discussed in more detail
later in this article; and that the provision of
insurance should move from the state to the private
sector or an NGO.
What has actually emerged in developing countries
after that first wave of failure, which it might be
premature to call “the micro-insurance movement”,
is something rather different from the neo-liberal
minimalist affair foreseen by the World Bank and
others. It has, essentially, three components, each
of which springs from a distinctive historical root.
The first is experimental schemes set up by NGOs
or, uncommonly these days, the state, to insure
against single perils, such as property, health and
life insurance risks. The scheme operated by
FINCA Uganda (Foundation for International
Community Assistance), to be analysed below, is a
good example of these. These attempt to draw on
the lessons from the failure of multiple-risk
schemes, and aim at least at financial sustainability
over the medium term; often they are connected
with micro-lending operations, and originate in
“emergency fund” life insurance schemes which
repay the outstanding balance of a loan in the event
that the borrower dies. The second strand is profit-
making schemes set up by the private sector, not
specifically to cater for the bottom end of the
market, but willing to offer small insurance
contracts to low-income borrowers; these derive
essentially from a movement downmarket by
commercial insurance businesses observing the
profits to be made out of microfinance.
The third strand, which overlaps with the first, is
schemes operated by not-for-profit organisations
which explicitly, on behalf of disadvantaged
groups, insure a range of social functions, generally
beginning with family health but often extending
into a range of personal asset insurances. One of
the oldest and most famous of these, SEWA (Self
Employed Women’s Association) of north-western
India, is also a registered trade union, and has
aimed since the 1970s to provide ‘work and
income security, food security and social security’
(Sinha 2002: xi), and to supply many of the
functions of social protection conventionally
supplied by the welfare state in industrialised
countries. As a women’s organisation, it addresses
the asymmetry of risk between men and women. A
similar gender focus characterises the Grameen
Kalyan (Grameen Welfare) established in 1996 to
handle the health insurance business of the
Grameen Bank, arising from the realisation that
‘illness was the major reason for 44 per cent of our
defaults’ (Daiyan 2001: 1). Other schemes of this
type, such as BRAC’s (Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee) rural health scheme, are
less strongly focused on women clients, but share
the same social objectives. The crux is, however,
that at least in this third sector of micro-insurance,
what we are seeing is an expansion into areas of
social protection not covered by conventional loan-
based microfinance (see Lund and Srinivas 2000).
Indeed, rather than the private sector expanding at
the expense of the public sector, the NGO sector is
expanding at the expense of both. The overall
social protection dimension of micro-insurance is
covered in more detail in Chapter 8 of Mosley
(2003).
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Illustrations of the distribution of micro-insurance
institutions by region and type are provided in
Table 1. As discussed by Brown and Churchill
(2000), progress during this second phase has been
most marked in the fields of life, health and property
insurance, with agriculture a long way down the list.
This ordering, and in particular the salience of
health, reflects the ordering put on specific risks, at
least in urban areas, by the respondents to the
2000/01 World Development Report (World Bank
2000), but the current gap in insurance schemes to
cover drought and flood risks is noteworthy.
The aim of this article is to examine how well, in
the light of previous experience, the sector is
reconciling the requirements of viability and
poverty reduction, and where possible to make
proposals for how this could be done better.
Section 2 examines design issues at the level of
which risks to cover, and then considers how the
insurance premium should be set. In Section 3 the
performance of some micro-insurance schemes to
date are examined, and quantitative impact
assessment results are presented for two cases. The
concluding Section 4 presents some tentative
policy recommendations.
2. The design of micro-insurance:
pricing, externality and incentives
2.1 Coverage and incentives
In order to reconcile the objectives of viability and
poverty reduction, the following hurdles have to be
overcome:
n Moral hazard: the tendency for the existence of
insurance to create perverse incentives to claim
spuriously and behave carelessly, causing resource
costs whichmay wipe out the benefits of insurance;
n Adverse selection: the tendency for the demand
for insurance to concentrate among the worst
risks; 
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Table 1: Classification of micro-insurance organisations
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Not-for-profit, single risk Not-for-profit, multiple risk Private sector, for-profit
Asia Grameen Life, Bangladesh SEWA, India Gono Bima, Bangladesh
ASA, Bangladesh BRAC Health, Bangladesh National Life, Bangladesh
BASIX Agricultural, India Groupe de Recherche et 
d’Echanges Technologiques 
(GRET), Cambodia
Latin America IPTK, Bolivia COLUMNA de Seguros,
Guatemala
Africa FINCA Health, Uganda King Finance, South Africa
CERUDEB weather 
insurance, Uganda
(in preparation)
K-REP/Chogoria Hospital,
Kenya
Bima ya Afya, Tanzania
Elsewhere
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n Effective targeting: the possibility that poor
clients may not opt for insurance; and
n Administrative cost: the risk that the
overcoming of all the above problems may
bankrupt the insurer.
As mentioned earlier, the current generation of
micro-insurance institutions has been engaged in a
strenuous process of learning from the failures of
previous insurance experiments in order to try to
achieve some reasonably satisfactory solution to the
problems mentioned above. The table in
Appendix 1 aims to enumerate some of the
solutions which have been adopted to these design
problems by a group of six microfinance institutions
in Africa and South Asia. Of the schemes described,
four (Grameen, BRAC, SEWA and FINCA) fit
within the “not-for-profit multiple risk” and two
(BASIX and CERUDEB) fit within the “not-for-profit
single risk” classification.We note, in particular, the
following points of common experience:
n All of the schemes are typically confined to
named insurable risks such as life,
hospitalisation and drought – insurable in the
sense that their likelihood of occurrence can be
predicted within reasonable limits. The
exception is BASIX1 agricultural insurance,
which in the old Indian tradition guarantees a
minimum return; but even here there are
exclusions to defend against moral hazard.
n Premiums are set by these non-profit
organisations in order to broadly cover costs,
already marking a huge advance on the old
generation of hugely loss-making insurance
schemes. In addition, in the health schemes, the
indemnity payout is limited by confining
payments to a fixed sum, which can be visualised
as the cost of the risk less an “excess” designed to
discourage excessive or improper claims.
n Additional controls against fraud and moral
hazard consist of ex-post checking of claims in
the case of the medical schemes, and a payout
based on rain deficiency, rather than on an
insubstantial crop in the case of the planned
CERUDEB agricultural insurance scheme. In
the BASIX crop insurance scheme the payout is
based on the deficiency in the value of the
harvest, but is further based on evidence of
good animal husbandry during the planting
and growing season.
n Of the schemes mentioned, only FINCA Health
employs an explicit defence against adverse
selection, which is to require at least two-thirds
of all group members to be members of the
insurance scheme.
n None of the insurance schemes listed below is
free-standing; all are layered on top of an
existing microfinance operation. This has
multiple implications:
1. There is a cost saving on the administration
and in particular the salesmanship of
insurance, since the infrastructure with
which to disseminate information about
the scheme is already in position.
2. Many clients only join insurance schemes
because of their existing bond with the
“parent” microfinance organisation (MFO).
This often, sometimes in conjunction with
an external shock (see below), acts as a
recruiting device for a new and unfamiliar
micro-insurance scheme which overcomes,
for new members, the barriers of cost and
unfamiliarity associated with membership.
Often pre-existing groups of microfinance
members have joined the scheme as a
group. In this sense, social capital is an
input into, as well as hopefully an output
of, the micro-insurance scheme. 
3. Over and above the “social” benefits of a
lower disaster risk for a given level of assets
and income, the sponsoring MFO, in all of
these cases, reaps the benefits of lower
default rates.
n All of the schemes have negotiated re-insurance
for themselves on local or international markets
– somewhat in contradiction of Brown and
Churchill’s claim that ‘reinsurance is largely
unavailable for micro-insurers’ (2000: xiii).
n Explicit targeting of the poor, in the sense of
concessional benefits for those below a certain
income level, is practised only by the
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Bangladesh institutions – Grameen and BRAC
– each of whom offer lower premiums to the
“ultra-poor”. The cost of this appears to be
minor. It also seems to be that the fraud/moral
hazard problem may be less with low-income
customers, as there is some evidence from the
trade that moral hazard risk declines with
income. As the general manager of the
COLUMNA insurance company in Guatemala
put it, ‘Thinking about how to take advantage
of an insurance policy seems to be something
that declines with income and education’ (cited
in Brown and Churchill 2000: 69). In other
words, targeting poor clients often acts as a
multiplier – as an additional defence against
moral hazard.
2.2 Putting learning into practice
The question now for discussion is whether some
further learning may be possible from the
experience of these schemes, which may enable
some diffusion of their benefits. This must be
placed in context: micro-insurance is by no means
the only instrument of poverty reduction or even of
risk reduction – savings, for example, may provide
better protection against common stresses; see
Brown and Churchill’s observation (2000: xii).
Firstly and most fundamentally, how can micro-
insurance be enabled to survive? The problem is
that to survive it needs to break even, but breaking
even requires very high premiums at the beginning
of operations when potential customers are
suspicious and unfamiliar with the concept; and so
the infant micro-insurance institution can easily be
caught up in a vicious circle of low demand, high
costs and high premiums. It can be expected that
the break-even premium will fall as the volume of
business increases, with the spreading of set-up,
administrative and promotion costs over a larger
and larger number of accounts (Figure 1a); but of
course it will never get a chance to fall if the market
never gets the chance to expand.
In such a case, a subsidy may be needed, in the
short term to move the insurer’s cost curve down to
the point where he becomes viable, and over the
longer term to give him time to move down the
cost curve and build up a clientele. Luckily, such a
subsidy can be justified from the external benefits
conferred by insurance, and does not have to be
justified on purely pragmatic grounds.
These external benefits are essentially of four kinds:
n Knowledge achieved by experimentation: By
experimenting with different institutional
designs, “pioneer” insurers create for their
successors ideas and information concerning
what will and will not work in a particular
environment. This information is free to the
successors, and thus confers an external benefit
on them, but it can only exist if the pioneer is
able to survive for long enough to develop and
test the original design.
n Bonding social capital: An insured group of
microfinance clients is less vulnerable than an
uninsured group, providing that payouts
happen reliably and on time. The variability of
income within the group is in principle less
and the likelihood that clients will be stopped
from making loan instalments by a sudden
negative shock is reduced, enabling trust
between clients within groups – “bonding
social capital” – to increase.
n Linking social capital: Evidence from BRAC
suggests that the consumption of insurance, in
combination with training, acts as an
empowering mechanism, motivating clients to
take a greater interest in the quality of the
healthcare they are receiving and thereby
improving it. The impact seems from interview
data to be a combination of premium, training
and group solidarity effects. However, the
introduction of the insurance appears to trigger
social capital between group members and
health service provider – benefits for which the
group members do not pay, so that they
constitute an external benefit of the scheme.
n Externalities from greater stability of income: if,
as a result of insurance, income becomes more
stable within a particular village or community,
this will give members of that community,
including non-microfinance clients, greater
certainty that their outstanding debts will be
paid. This is because an unexpected crisis need
no longer cause default if it is insured. This in
turn should have positive effects on investment
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Figure 1: ‘Break-even’ insurance premia
(a) Financial criterion only
(b) Financial and economic criteria
Break-even insurance
premium
Cost of insurance:
Break-even premium
(financial criterion)
Demand for
insurance=clients’
willingness to pay
Size of insurer’s
portfolio
Size of insurer’s
portfolio
Demand for insurance=clients’
willingness to pay
‘triangle of
profitability
Break-even premium less
subsidy on all external
benefits (wider impacts)
Cost of insurance:
Break-even premium
(financial criterion)
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Table 2: BRAC and FINCA: indicators of impact
BRAC, Bangladesh FINCA, Uganda
1. Operational indicators
Profitability About 80% of costs of claims plus About 73% of costs of claims plus 
operations currently covered from operations currently covered from
premiums. premiums.
Arrears rates 1.6% of insured, 1.4% for uninsured
(i.e. difference ‘positive’ but insignificant)1
2. Indicators of direct impact
Savings Positive (significant at 5% level)2
Investment Positive* Positive (significant at 1% level)2
Educational expenditure Positive* Positive (significant at 5% level)2
Loan growth Positive (significant at 1% level)1
Vulnerability 83% of respondents say that membership
of the scheme gives ‘more peace of mind’
3. Indicators of indirect (“wider”) impact
Financial risk to sponsor 71% of respondents feel ‘less likely to get 
into financial trouble since joining the 
scheme’2
Stability of income Positive* Insignificant difference between treatment 
and control group2
Social capital and ‘The scheme has encouraged us to Improved levels of trust within solidarity 
intra-group relations take more interest in the quality of groups2
healthcare we are receiving’
Incorporation of socially The scheme has been extended to Little evidence (indeed, scheme members 
excluded a number of ultra-poor clients are better off than non-scheme members)2
4. Side-effects
Relations with hospital staff Became more neglectful in some cases2
Care for personal health No evidence of moral hazard (DPT
(moral hazard) vaccination and malaria protection rates 
same between treatment and control
group)2
Sources: BRAC: field tests, Sultanpur, April 2002. FINCA: 1 survey of 200 clients, January 2003, from
FINCA records; 2 survey of 62 clients from Nsambya and Mukisa branches, Kampala, interviewed February
2003. Data for survey (2) available from p.mosley@sheffield.ac.uk and more detailed results are provided
in Mosley (2003: Chapter 6).
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– including human capital investment in
education and training.
n Externalities from the downward extension of
the market for financial services: If, because
poorer people are more in need of institutions
such as insurance, which protect livelihood
security, poorer people may be brought into the
market for financial services, and eventually
derive benefit from it, in a manner that does
not expose them to excessive levels of risk in
the vulnerable early stages.
We can now introduce additional instruments, and
examine the strategies by which different
institutions have sought to balance viability against
a focus on the poor:
n Marketing strategies and demand expansion: if
these are successful, they can move the
demand curve outwards, and enlarge the
“triangle of profitability”. The experience of
several institutions suggests that the insurance
concept is not well understood by clients, so
that even if their latent demand is strong on the
grounds of risk aversion, their effective
demand is weak. Some of this weakness arises
from an under-estimation by clients of the risks
to which they are exposed.2 Imaginative
marketing strategies have been used by some
organisations to overcome this blockage.3 But
often what has caused a big surge in demand
has been nothing to do with marketing policy,
but rather an extraneous event which has made
individuals only too well aware of the risks to
which they are exposed – such as the Gujerat
earthquake of January 2001, following which
membership of the SEWA insurance scheme
rose from 30,000 to 100,000 in a single year.
n Product diversification: this again can achieve a
boost to demand if it becomes saturated within
particular market sectors. Thus Grameen and
BRAC of Bangladesh have diversified from life
insurance into health insurance; BASIX from
agricultural insurance, which it has now given
up, into life and livestock insurance; and
SEWA, which began by offering a basic life
insurance product, into insuring healthcare for
clients, their spouses and now (2002) their
children. However, the diversification process
is risky, because there is evidence among the
first-generation schemes of a tendency for the
cost of providing insurance to rise
exponentially as the range of risks covered
increases.
3. Wider impacts of micro-
insurance and their management:
evidence from two institutions
Under the Imp-Act programme, a range of impacts
has been measured, or is in the course of being
measured, for two of Imp-Act’s partner institutions,
featured in the preceding section: BRAC,
Bangladesh and FINCA, Uganda. Traditional
control-group methods have been used with a
group of insurance clients and non-clients in both
institutions. The results are recorded in Table 2,
and are divided into four groups:
n Indicators of operational performance;
n Indicators of client-level impact; 
n Indicators of wider impact, which go beyond
the individual client; and
n Side-effects.
We may briefly summarise these impacts as
follows: the insurance schemes are quite close to
being viable in their own right, and there is some
evidence that they improve repayment rates;
insurance appears to have a positive impact on
physical and human capital expenditures,
apparently mediated via higher absorptive capacity
for loans; insurance clients perceive themselves as
less vulnerable than non-clients; and several of the
“wider impacts” on which we speculated above do
indeed materialise, including, in Bangladesh,
higher stability of income of expenditure and
incorporation of the ultra-poor, and lower
exposure for the lender.
Here, the focus is on the wider impacts, which fall,
as earlier discussed, into four distinct categories.
Table 2 provides some indication of what needs to
be done to make these effects operational:
n Effects operating via stability of income and
expenditure, which transmitted scheme
benefits from clients to non-clients: These
appear, in both countries, to have raised
physical investment, often in the business, but
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even more typically in the home. Land
purchase was the most commonly cited form of
investment under this heading. Sometimes
insurance raised human capital investment;
there were also, in Uganda, minor effects on
labour hiring which had a small multiplier
effect on poverty reduction.
n Effects operating via social capital and
interpersonal relations: These are both positive
and negative. Within local communities there
is compelling evidence that “bonding” social
capital, in the sense of trust, has indeed been
strengthened as a consequence of the advent of
insurance. In many cases this was as a
consequence of expenditure and liability
becoming more predictable, so that individuals
had an increased incentive to trust one another.
A particular aspect of this predictability was
reduced reliance on informal emergency
borrowing.
n Effects operating via the downward extension of
the market for financial services: Especially in
Bangladesh, pressure has been exerted to make
sure that some ultra-poor clients join the
scheme, and consequently, a social inclusion
impact has been deliberately engineered into the
implementation of the scheme. Again, this effect
is not inescapable; in Uganda, in spite of our
prior hypothesis that the demand for insurance
would be greatest amongst the poorest,
insurance scheme members are actually richer
than the control group of non-members.
n Effects operating through the provision of an
institutional model: For example, information
on the design of the existing, pioneering,
micro-insurance institutions and the lessons
which can be learned from their experience can
be transmitted almost without cost via the
internet and other means to those wishing to
emulate and improve on their precedent.
4. Conclusion
As this article has argued, micro-insurance is a
fundamentally good idea, but one which is
dependent on agents external to the typical market
process. As a consequence there is a case for
subsidy; however, there is also a case for regulation,
since, because the protective motive of insurance
appeals particularly strongly to the poorest people,
the customers of micro-insurance schemes are at
risk of exploitation within an unregulated market.
Therefore creativity and flexibility are required by
regulators to protect vulnerable customers, while at
the same time enabling innovators to offer them an
insurance product on a small and experimental
scale.
Impact assessment, presented in Section 3,
suggests that in some cases the expected benefits of
micro-insurance do not materialise; in particular
there is little evidence in Uganda that the advent of
micro-insurance has enabled a downward
extension of the market for financial services.
However, even though much of the available
evidence is still inconclusive, there is little doubt
that the micro-insurance schemes examined have
contributed enormously to the peace of mind of
low-income clients, who are now able to afford
such necessities as their children’s healthcare,
without worrying about their debts.
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Notes
1. BASIX is an Indian MFO comprising a non-banking
finance company engaged in credit and an NGO
engaged in technical assistance.
2. As the director of Grameen Kalyan put it, ‘people are
not aware of their health before they become
bedridden’ : Interview, Sheikh Abdud Daiyan,
Dhaka, 8 January 2002. 
3. The Peruvian microinsurance organisation IFOCC
‘created simple figures to help clients understand the
benefit and the relative cost of the insurance. In
addition, IFOCC helped clients to understand the
relative size of the premium payments by asking
them to think of the funds received from a loan as a
jaguar, the interest paid on the loan as a rabbit, and
the insurance premium as a cuy or guinea pig’
(Brown and Churchill 2000: 20).
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re
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A
ppendix 1
(cont.):Six ‘new
-generation’m
icro-insurance schem
es: sum
m
ary description
Schem
e
SEW
A
FIN
C
A
G
ram
een
K
alyan
BRA
C
H
ealth
C
ERU
D
EB
BA
SIX
Prem
ium
Three
options:
$46 (U
shs 69,000)
100–120 taka/
100 taka
plus 
6%
ofbasic
loan
($/annum
)
I:$1.53
per 4
fam
ily 
$2.50 (non-
2 taka/visit
am
ount for rainfall
II:$3.67
m
em
bers
m
em
bers); 
(m
em
bers);
insurance
III:$7.44
50 taka/$1
250 taka
plus 
(m
em
bers)
5 taka/visit 
(non-m
em
bers)
Targeting
devices
Richer m
em
bers can
D
iscounts for 
D
iscounts for 
V
illage self-
and
other special
becom
e
life
m
em
bers 
ultra-poor
ultra-poor
m
anagem
ent –
of
features
of schem
e through 
the 20%
m
entioned
fixed
deposit ofRs 700; 
above,10%
goes 
these
paym
ents cross-
to
a village
fund, 
subsidise
poorer 
5%
 to
an
inter-
m
em
bers.Tw
o-thirds 
village
fund
(w
hich
ofprem
ium
is 
finances payouts) 
subsidised
by grants 
and
5%
 to
BA
SIX
from
G
TZ
and
M
inistry ofLabour
*
FIN
C
A
exclusions: the schem
e w
ill
not cover –
com
plex dental surgery other than
as a result of
an
accident; optical
appliances; hearing
aids; cosm
etic
surgery; intentional self-inflicted
injury or illness; injury or illness arising
out ofintentionalinvolvm
ent in riot,civilcom
m
otion,affray,politicalor illegal
act by a
m
em
ber; alcoholism
or drug
addiction.
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